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Organization: An Analysis of Bilateral
Trade Barrier Removal

Michael X. Feeney
Research Honors
4/25/2008

Abstract:
With rising petroleum costs and a plethora of other influences causing international
ethanol demand to grow at an unprecedented rate, discussion of trade liberalization has become
an important point of debate for the ethanol production industry. Although there have been many
studies on the results of the removal of trade barriers there has been little emphasis on the
potential impact it would have on domestic industrial organization. This paper looks to analyze
the possible effects of ethanol trade barrier removal between Brazil and the United States on U.S.
industrial organization through evaluation of the removal's ,influence on incentives for
consolidation in both fanner and non-fanner owned sectors of the U.S. ethanol production
industry. Both the existing deadweight loss due to the accumulation of trade barrier costs and the
potential for costs associated with increased market concentration are compared in the evaluation
prooess as well as evaluation and incorporation of theory on trade flows and market structure
resulting from trade tariff removal.

I.

Introduction

It is uncertain whether or not when Henry Ford described ethanol as "the fuel of the

future l " he had such a distant future in mind. For nearly a century, oil has dominated transport
fuel markets as the primary automotive energy source. However, metaphorically speaking, the
stars have aligned for the ethanol production industry. Predictions that world oil reserves are
approaching exhaustion combined with increasing concern over rising international crude oil
prices, greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, energy independence, and other important
factors have caused an unprecedented boom in global ethanol production and trade. With such
rapid increases in the international trade of ethanol, hastily constructed trade agreements and
domestic and international trade practices/policy are shaping the industrial structure of this still
emerging global industry. It is estimated that tariffs onethanol trade between the United States
and Brazil have already cost nearly 80 million dollars in social deadweight loss2. For this reason
a rather large and influential group of political leaders and economists, headed by Jeb Bush the
co-chairmen of the Interamerican Ethanol Commission, are advocating the removal of barriers
currently designed to promote and protect domestic production 3 . This paper looks to analyze the
possible effects of ethanol trade tariff removal between Brazil and the United States on U.S.
industrial organization through evaluation of the resulting increase of incentives for

I William Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" JCIS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
http://www.icis.com/publications.
2Ariadna Martinex-Gonzalez, Ian M. Sheldon, and Stanley Thompson, "Estimating the Welfare Effects of U.S.
Distortions in the Ethanol Market Using a Partial Equilibrium Trade Model" Journal ofAgriculture and Food
Industrial Organization 5 (2007): 227-42.
3Interamerican Ethanol Commission, "Leadership" Interamerican Ethanol Commission,
http://he I pfue Ithe fu ture. org/weblcontent! viewl41/541
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consolidation in both fanner and non-farmer owned sectors of the U.S. ethanol production
industry.

II.

Background

In the timeline for automotive transportation, ethanol is even older than the Model T. It
has been produced and consumed in the United States and Brazil throughout the past century.
Ethanol was first used as a transport fuel in the U.S. around 1908 and its mass production
continued into the late 1930's at which time a plant in Atchison, Kansas was producing nearly 18
million gallons of ethanol per year for over two thousand service stations across the Midwestern
United States4 . However, after Wodd War II petroleum based alternatives became available in
mass and at low costs taking over the international markets for transport fuel. Interest in U.S.
ethanol production did not resurface until 1978 when the tlrst tax exemptions were passed for
gasoline blended with 10% ethanol 5.
Even during ethanol's global decline in the 1940's Brazil has been a significant outlier in
the global trend away from ethanol and towards its petroleum based substitute, gasoline. In
Brazil a 5% blending of anhydrous ethanol into the nation's gasoline was first approved in 1931
and then made mandat~ry in 1938 6 . Ethanol became recognized as more than just an additive in
the early 1970' s when Brazilian spending on foreign crude oil quadrupled. With such an increase
in spending ethanol began to be seen as a serious alternative to crude oil? Government officials

William Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" lCJS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
http://www.icis.com/publications.
5 Joseph Dipardo. "Outlook for Biomass Ethanol Production and Demand:. Energy Information Administration.
(200 I): 1-14. <www.eia.doe.gov/oia£.analysispaperlbiomass.html>.
6 Masami Kojima and Todd Johnson. "Potential for Biofuels for Transportation in Developing Countries" World
Banke Energy and Water Department, http://www.esmap.org/filezipubs/31205BifuelsforWeb.pdf.
7W illiam Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" lCJS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
http://www.icis.com/publications
4
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foresaw the need for better domestic availability of ethanol and by 1975 Brazil initiated
Proalcool, a forceful program of incentives for domestic ethanol production. With the help of
Proalcool subsidies, Brazilian ethanol production quickly rose from 158 million to approximately
900 million gaUons per year in 1978. Ethanol production continued to grow when in 1979
another oil crisis hit Brazil causing the price of crude oil to more than triple. As energy
independence became an even more important goal for Brazil even car manufactures joined the
ethanol revolution. By 198676% of Brazil's new cars were made with modified ethanol engines
and domestic ethanol production reached 3.5 billion gallons 8 . This far surpassed U.S. production
at this time which was still only 710 million gallons, making Brazil the pioneer of large scale
ethanol production

9

.

Brazil's ethanol production and consumption slipped in the late 1980's and early 1990's
as the domestic subsidies provided by Proalcool were greatly reduced. This removal of subsidies
triggered reduction in ethanol supply resulting in an ethanol shortage that shook consumer
confidence. A reduction in ethanol consumption soon followed and by 1990 the proportion of
new cars produced with ethanol engines dropped to 11 % 10. However, nearly a decade later the
introduction of the flex fuel automobile, a vehicle with an engine capable of running on both
ethanol and gasoline along with, once again, rising oil prices increased international interest in
alternative energy sources causing Brazil's domestic ethanol production to resurge. By 2006
Brazilian production rose to roughly 4.5 billion gaUons per year and is predicted to reach as high

8W ill iam

Lemos, 'The Brazilian Model" lCIS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
http://www.icis.com/publications.
9Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
http://www.etha nolrfa. orglindustry/statistics/.
10 William Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" lCIS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
http://www.icis.com/publications.
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as 9 billion gallons per year by 2013

11

•

However, even with a head start and historically high

levels of domestic support for ethanol production, Brazil is currently only the second largest
producer of ethanol in the world.
The United States is the world's largest producer of ethanol and like Brazil is
experiencing record expansion in the industry. U.S. ethanol production has increased
dramatically in recent years. Currently, the U.S. produces roughly 7.2 billion gallons of ethanol
per year with another 6.2 billion gallons of yearly production capacity under construction l2 .
However, even though Brazil and the United States are industry leaders and unrivaled in their
ethanol production abilities, thus far both countries still employ protectionist policies designed to
shelter their domestic ethanol production industries. This protection is achieved by virtually
prohibiting ethanol trade between the two countries with steep import tariffs 13.
Discussion of ethanol trade between the U.S. and Brazil begins with its production process
and use of feedstock, or the biomass from which the ethanol is produced. Much like the process
used to make moonshine, the production of Ethanol is a microbial conversion of biomass or
feedstock such as corn or sugarcane into alcohol 14. Although ethanol can be produced from
sugars found in a variety of different plant biomasses, in Brazil and the United States it is
produced almost exclusively from com or sugarcane. First, the biomass is converted into sugars,
which are fermented. After this fermentation process water is removed from the product creating
the substance known as anhydrous ethanol. In the final step anhydrous ethanol is denatured, a

11Wiliiam Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" lCIS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
http://www.icis.com/publications.
12 Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/.
13 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 189-205.
14Moreira, Jose R. and Goldember, Jose. ''The Alcohol Program," Energy Policy (1999) 229-245
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blending process that makes ethanol unfit for human consumption by adding amounts of
substances like gasoline l5 .
Generally, producers of anhydrous ethanol do not blend their own ethanol, this is done by an
industry of blenders or refiners separate from the initial production process. Because anhydrous
ethanol produced from any feedstock is essentially the same product it is assumed to be
homogenous or a non-differentiable good. This means that ethanol blenders can purchase
anhydrous ethanol without regard for its source-biomass I6 . This study will focus only on
Brazilian ethanol made from sugarcane and

u.s. ethanol produced from com assuming the

quantities of ethanol produced from other feedstock to be insignificant in relation to

u.s.

Brazilian trade and its effects on industrial organization.
Ethanol produced from sugarcane is far less expensive to produce than ethanol produced
from com. However, transportation costs limit sugarcane's use in the United States, a country
that for the most part lacks the tropical climate and rainfall necessary for mass sugarcane
production. Additionally, because all ethanol is part of a weight losing production process the
most efficient structure for ethanol production will result in an industrial organization where
ethanol production facilities are located in relatively close proximity to the areas where their
specific feedstock is produced 17. For this reason the U.S. is limited to the production of com
based ethanol and Brazil, having the ability to produce sugarcane, may use this feedstock as a
more efficient source of ethanol production. Once the original feedstock is transformed into
anhydrous ethanol, it is, as was mentioned, a homogenous product l8 .

f5 Masami Kojima and Todd Johnson. "Potential for Biofuels for Transportation in Developing Countries" World
Banke Energy and Water Department, http://www.esmap.org/filezipubs/31205BifuelsforWeb. pdf.
16 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New
York: McGraw-Hili, 2008), 197
17 Moreira, Jose R. and Goldember, Jose. "The Alcohol Program," Energy Policy (1999) 229-245
18 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New
York: McGraw-Hili, 2008), 189-205.
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Both the United States and Brazil currently restrict the trade of both anhydrous and
blended ethanol. Brazil protects its domestic production industry with a tax of roughly 30% on
all imported ethanol. The United States imposes a 54 cents per gallon and 2.5% advalorum tax or
tariffon all imported ethanol. The United States also offers a 51 cents per gallon production
subsidy by way of tax credit to the ethanol blenders in order to account for the comparative
advantage Brazilian producers of anhydrous ethanol obtain from the use of sugarcane as a more
efficient feedstock. The tariffs, applied to both anhydrous and blended ethanol, effectively
prevent ethanol trade between the U.S. and Brazil creating a situation in which both countries
only produce ethanol for domestic consumption and for export to countries without significant
import tariffs on ethanol 19. This closed structure can be viewed in Figure 1.
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19 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 195.

7

Therefore, in presence of trade tariffs, ethanol trade between the

u.s. and Brazil is

virtually nonexistent. This is depicted in the simplified trade flow diagram of Figure 2. The
exception to this prevention of exchange is a small exemption in international policy. Under
provisions in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) member states are able to export ethanol made
from at least 50% U.S. produced feedstock to the United States free from dutlo. Because of this
policy, Jamaica is now the second largest importer of ethanol into the United States with other
CBI countries following close behind 21 . However, in reality this imported ethanol is not a
product of Jamaica. Instead, the policy allows for the importation of Brazilian ethanol through
countries like Jamaica. The amount imported is a rather small. In 2006 sixty million gallons, only
about 7% of the United States' domestic production, entered the country duty free through CBI
proVIsIOns 22 .

20 Ariel Cohen, "Two Cheers for the President's Brazilian Ethanol Initiative" WebMemo by The Heritage
Foundation no. 140 I (2007), http://www.heritage.orglresearch/energyandenvironement/wm 140 I.cfm.
21Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustry/statistics/.
22 Ariel Cohen, "Two Cheers for the President's Brazilian Ethanol Initiative" WebMemo by The Heritage
Foundation no. 140 I (2007), http://www.heritage.orglresearch/energyandenvironement/wm 140 l.cfm.
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Figure 2

Under this relatively closed trade status of industry protection, growth in U.s. ethanol
production has developed into an internally competitive domestic production industry.
Approximately 140 firms of various sizes are producing anhydrous ethanol across the United
States23 . The Federal Trade Commission or FTC, confirmed this internal competitiveness in its
report on the market concentration of the U.S. ethanol production industry. Market
Concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirsclunan Indices (HHI). This process looks to
define whether or not a single firm or small group oftirms could wield sufficient market power
23Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustry/statistics/.
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to set prices or coordinate on prices or output. This is an activity far from unheard of in the
agricultural processing industry. The results fall into one of three categories: unconcentrated with
an HHI score from 0 to 999, moderately concentrated with an HHI score from 1000 to 1799, or
highly concentrated with an HHI Score of 1800 or above. The higher a market's HHI score, the
more concentrated it is and the more likely it is that market prices are subject to a set price or
coordinated influence. Using production capacity data provided by the Renewable Fuels
Association or RFA, the FTC's 2006 report gave an HHI score ofjust over 500 to the ethanol
production industry. The report therefore concluded the market to be unconcentrated. It also
indicated that market concentration in the ethanol production industry, according to annual HHI
scores, has been falling for nearly a decade

24

.

Reduced concentration is desirable in ethanol production as a more competitive, less
concentrated market structure is generally viewed to be more socially beneficial due to the basic
economic theory surrounding competition and market power of a commodity like ethanol 25 . A
competitive market requires many sellers, a rdatively homogenous product being sold, relatively
small market shares held by each firm, a situation where no one seller views its market share as
threatened by a competing seller, freely accessible information, and freedom of market entry and
exit. With enough firms producing the same product and no one seller holding a sufficient share
in the market to be able to influence buyers, then each firm will compete equally and the market
price will settle at the point where the marginal cost to producers is equal to the marginal benefit
or demand of consumers. Through the process of competition societal benefit is maximized with

24
25

FTC, "2006 Report on Ethanol Market Concentration" Federal Trade Commission (2006).27.
Moreira, Jose R. and Goldember, Jose. "The Alcohol Program," Energy Policy (1999) 229-245
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an appropriate price to quantity relationship in which, theoretically, the maximum number of
consumers is supplied at the lowest price still covering the costs of production26 .
This study assumes that ethanol sufficiently fits the criteria to merit a perfectly competitive
market. Both anhydrous and blended ethanol are homogenous. As a traded commodity, ethanol
industry information is publicly regulated and open, no significant barriers exist to market entry
or exit in the ethanol production industry and currently the deconcentrated nature of the market
shows that firms should not perceive a threat to their market share. Thus, the U.S. ethanol
production industry seems to be adhering to economic theory and appropriate industrial
organization by trending towards a less concentrated market structure27 .
One misperception about the ethanol is that the United States' ethanol production industry is
often perceived as a farm based enterprise. However, over halfofU.S. ethanol production
capacity is current y non-farmer owned. The majority of non-farmer owned production is
controlled by large, often multinational companies. The top two ethanol production companies
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and POET control approximately 34% of all ethanol production
and the top five production companies account for roughly 47% ofproduction28 . By analyzing
the breakdown of farmer owned vs. non-farmer owned production capacity currently under
construction, it can be seen that U.S. industrial organization is trending quickly towards a more
non-farmer owned industrial structure29 . This is important to the overall market concentration of
the United States' ethanol production industry as market deconcentration has traditionally
occurred during a time when non-farmer or privately owned capacity decreased as a percentage

David Hyman. Economics (Burr Ridge: Richard D. Irwin inc., 1994),352
ibid.
28 Harnza Hasan. "Overveiw of U.S. Ethanol Market." Food FirstlInst~tute for Food & Development Policy.
http://www.foodfirst.org/nodel1723.
29 Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
http://v.rww.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/.
26
27
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of total production. This indicates that, historically, the distinction between ownership type has
been significant in analyzing market concentration 30. This correlation can be seen in Figure 3
graphs constructed from FTC data along with data from the RFA. This shift towards a privately
dominated industry is evident in the construction of new ethanol plants. Because the production
industry looks to double in size within the next three years and a very large majority of the new
construction is non-farmer owned the industry wi]! soon be dominated by private firms.
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The trend away from farmer owned cooperative plants is potentially important in analyzing
the effects of trade barrier removal on the industrial organization of ethanol. Farmer owned
capacity is often viewed as synonymous with cooperative production capacity as most of the
farmer owned capacity constructed is organized in a cooperative structure. A farmer owned
cooperative is comprised of individuals that have pooled their funds to construct a locally
operated production facility. This allows a farmer to gain partial ownership in an ethanol
production facility usually with an agreement that at least a specific amount of grain be sold to
the facility each year. Farmers share in the dividends of the production facility as well as utilize
the sale of ethanol as a means of hedging the risk of crop prices. This distribution of dividends
and use of ethanol production as a means of hedging reinvests more of the revenue generated by
ethanol production into the rural economy. Yet, it also provides less potential for reinvestment in
capital expansion. Cooperatives also have limited access to other sources of capital, most
notably venture capital. Since the main goal of a cooperative is to realize market gains and
distribute the benefits of these gains amongst its members, it is limited in its ability to reinvese 1.
Because ownership ultimately makes decisions on consolidation and expansion, this study will
evaluate the probable effects of trade barrier removal between the U.S. and Brazilian ethanol
production industries on both U.S. farmer and non-farmer owned production sectors.

31

CFA "A Brief on a Canadian Cooperative Investment Plan" Canadian Federation ofAgriculture Publications
(2007) 2.
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III. Review of Literature
Ethanol, as an international commodity and viable substitute for oil consumption, has
only recently become a subject of intensive academic research. For this reason, the literature
analyzing international ethanol markets is very new and the quantity available is limited. Yet, the
studies that are available contain very pertinent and up to date analysis allowing new research in
the field of ethanol trade tariffs and subsidization to be relatively cutting edge.
In-depth analysis of trade tariffs and the price effects of trade liberalization is available in
a 2007 article for the Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization's special issue on
biofuels. This article analyzes reductions in the tariffs imposed on Brazilian imports of sugarcane
ethanol to the United States and vice versa. Using a partial equilibrium trade model, the analysis
predicts the effects of industry trade distortions on societal deadweight losses surrounding
ethanol trade. Through this process the authors claim that static deadweight loss under current
conditions is roughly $80.62 million and that cumulative losses by 2017 would be roughly
$2,400 million 32 .
In Suani Coelho's report to the United Nations on advantages and trade barriers in the
global biofuels markets, the argument is made that trade barriers are making the global
development of ethanol problematic. The report shows that Brazil has a clear advantage over the
United States in ethanol production with much lower costs. Coelho suggests a move toward trade
liberalization. However, Coelho also admits that countries mandating ethanol use and providing

Ariadna Martinex-Gonzalez, Ian M. Sheldon, and Stanley Thompson, "Estimating the Welfare Effects of U.S.
Distortions in the Ethanol Market Using a Partial Equilibrium Trade Model" Journal ofAgriculture and Food
Industrial Organization 5 (2007): 227-42.

32
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incentives for domestic production serve to positively promote the learning curve ofbiofuels
. 33
pro duchon .

Paul Gallagher's 2006 study on international competitiveness of the U.S. corn ethanol
industry as compared to Brazilian sugarcane ethanol production uses an econometric model to
estimate U.S. produced ethanol's ability to compete. In the subsequent time series analysis of
competitiveness in trade flows, Gallagher argues that both Brazilian and U.S. tariffs could be
reduced for the benefit of both countries. Brazil, he argues, may have less incentive for such
action because they are currently using the Caribbean Basin Agreement to re-export ethanol to
the United States. However, Gallagher maintains that more so than Brazil, the U.S. may see
incentives for the removal of trade barriers. Once barriers are removed Gallagher predicts
relatively equal flows between the U.S. and Brazil based on random seasonal factors 34 .
David Sandalow's book "Freedom from Oil" provides a new and interesting perspective
on the future of trade policy regarding ethanol. Sandalow argues that if the goal of the United
States is energy independence its current trade restrictions are "utterly illogical." He maintains
that if correctly phased out U.S. tariffs on ethanol importation could benefit the nation without
any negative effect to farmers which he notes as a major concern of policy makers. Because
current subsidies are given to blenders of ethanol which can process ethanol from any country
just as easily, the tariff on ethanol imports is necessary to keep the U.S. from subsidizing
international production. In the interest of free trade and societal gain, Sandalow suggests that
the trade tariffs on ethanol imports be removed. He argues that in order to counteract this
reduction in trade barriers, the 51 cent per gallon tax credit/subsidy given to blenders should be

33 Suani Coelho, "Biofuels ~ Advantages and Trade Barriers" (Report presented at the United Nations conference
on Trade and Development, 1-28, 2005).
34 Paul Gallgher, "The International Competitiveness of the U.S. Com-Ethanol Industry: A Comparison with Sugar
Ethanol Processing in Brazil" Agribusiness 22 (2006): 110-134.
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given instead directly to ethanol producers. This would keep

u.s. ethanol policy from essentially

subsidizing foreign production while keeping its ethanol competitively priced 35 .
Although there is sufficient argument and economic backing to make a case for removing
trade barriers between the United States and Brazil there has been little done to predict the
resulting effects on industrial organization due to this removal of trade barriers. This study will
expand upon current trade liberalization arguments by attempting to produce significant theory
on the effects of trade liberalization on trade flows, economies of scale, and the possibility of
market concentration through increased incentives for consolidation. It is expected that the costs
to trade liberalization will be outweighed by the potential costs of market consolidation negating
the benefits of trade tariff removal.

IV. Theory and Analysis
According to the most recent literature, removal of trade tariffs would drastically alter
trade flows between the United States and Brazil. Following Sandalow's suggestion that the 54
cents per gallon and 2.5% advalorum taxes on imports should be lifted while the U.S. production
subsidy for ethanol blenders is shifted to producers and assuming that Brazil would also lift its
tariff on imported ethanol, bilateral trade of both anhydrous and blended ethanol would be
possible between the U.S. and Brazil as is shown in Figure 4. However, unless the 51 cents per
gallon subsidy to U.S. blenders is shifted to producers of anhydrous ethanol, the blenders who
are able to purchase without regard to the feedstock used to produce anhydrous ethanol could
pass the subsidy along to Brazilian producers effectively causing U.S. tax dollars to subsidize
David Sanda1ow, Freedom From Oil: HolV the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008),189-205.

35
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Brazilian ethanol production. If the subsidy is removed completely U.S. production of anhydrous
ethanol would not be abk to compete with the cheaper more efficient ethanol production process
used in Brazil because of the availability of sugarcane 36 •
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Because of seasonal variances in the price of feedstock, removal of tariffs on ethanol
trade between the United States and Brazil will lead to relatively equal bilateral trade where
neither Brazil nor the United States dominates. Instead the two countries will trade with each
other rather equally. In these more open markets both anhydrous ethanol producers and blenders
would be able to trade their homogenous products to consumer markets in the opposing

David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 189-205.

36
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country37. Brazilian blenders would have the opportunity to purchase U.S. corn-based ethanol
during times when factor prices make u.s. produced anhydrous ethanol cheaper. U.s. blenders
would have exactly the same opportunity to purchase Brazilian anhydrous ethanol. Exchange of
this nature means that trade flows would exist after trade barrier removal that were previously
unavailable, changing the international market structure for both anhydrous and blended
ethano1 38 .
Because the price of subsidized u.s. com-based ethanol and Brazilian sugarcane-based
ethanol are relatively equal in price, trade will occur in unpredictable seasonal patters 39 .This
equal trade will occur as virtually unlimited factors including crop yield projections weather
patters consumer confidence estimates and predicted political actions in both Brazil and the
United States have the potential to cause price fluctuations making it less expensive to buy
ethanol from Brazil one day and the United States the next40 . These open avenues for exchange
would combine to create the increased trade flow patterns as is shown in Figure 5.

37 paul Gallgher, "The International Competitiveness of the U.S. Com-Ethanol Industry: A Comparison with Sugar
Ethanol Processing in Brazil" Agribusiness 22 (2006): 110-134.
38 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New
York: McGraw-Hili, 2008), 189-205.
39 Paul Gallgher, "The International Competitiveness of the U.S. Com-Ethanol Industry: A Comparison with Sugar
Ethanol Processing in Brazil" Agribusiness 22 (2006): 110-134.
40 RP Campbell. Personal Interview. Archer Daniels Midland. Decatur, IL., 12 March 2008.
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Figure 5

With such an increase in the velocity of trade between the United States and Brazil, it
can be assumed that economies of scale will provide larger firms with the ability to lower their
costs through more specialized and consolidated departments for management and marketing·,
specifically international marketing abilities or the ability to sell effectively in complex
international markets will become an advantage to ethanol production firms. Economies of scale
occur when the long run average total cost curve declines with increases in output41 . In a tariff
free ethanol market, specialized management and marketing teams would provide for more
efficient, lower cost, sales in the now more complex and volatile transnational markets for
• It is important to note that marketing as used in this paper refers to the buying and selling of the commodity

ethanol and not the more informal definition referring to a firm's advertising abilities.
41

Gregory Mankiw, Essentials ofEconomics (Thomson South-Western, 2004),180-185
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ethanol. Specialization in marketing including multinational presence would give large
internationally established companies an advantage in ethanol marketing through their ability to
more accurately act on market infonnation. For example, when visiting the ADM international
headquarters one will notice that all commodity marketers are in one large open room filled with
employees specializing in currency and commodity exchange for specific locations around the
world. Hundreds of workers can easily communicate with one another, exchanging important
infonnation about price changes or potential price influences in related markets. The ethanol
marketers for ADM are just steps away from hundreds of individuals specializing in different
markets and different global regions, making their marketing decisions more infonned and
logically more efficient than a small finn with just one or two marketers to make decisions about
the sale of the ethanol their company produces

42

.

This is an advantage of specialization and more

efficient transnational marketing ability is seen by larger finns and increases with the more open
international trading. In order to establish efficient scale or the point at which average total cost
is minimized smaller firms would see incentives to achieve the marketing advantages held by
larger producers.
In order to achieve these newly available economies of scale finns have two basic
options. The first option is to expand their production capacities through increasing the size of an
existing plant or constructing a new plant. With the use of basic supply and demand analysis it
can be seen that increasing a finn's capacity through construction would increase ethanol supply
and drive down the price of ethanol making it an undesirable avenue for achieving economies of
scale. The second option, consolidation, would achieve scale economies without increasing total
ethanol supply. With supply remaining the same, the market price would remain unchanged.
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Therefore, acting in their own self interests finns would logically choose to expand through
consolidation43 . One barrier to consolidation is that finns would not want to acquire production
facilities which are not technologically up to date as they would then gain in production size but
loose in efficiency due to increases in the costs of production for a less advanced plant. However,
this is a relative non-issue in the ethanol production industry as the vast majority of production
facilities have been constructed in the past five years and can therefore be assumed to be up to
date technologically44.
Once it is established that consolidation will occur, how it will occur must then be
implied separately for both fanner owned and privately owned production as this distinction has
shown significant influence on market concentration in the past. Despite their unique structure
and the dual nature of the benefits received by a fanner owned production facility, economies of
scale would still exist for cooperatives and, baring the existence of some values-based objection,
cooperatives would act in their own self interest and seek out a new efficient scale4s . However,
as was mentioned earlier the cooperative structure of ownership leaves a fanner owned finn with
limited capital for investment. This disadvantage makes most cooperatives unlikely acquisitors in
the consolidation process46 . One option for cooperatives to retain their ownership structure and
achieve economies of scale would be to fonn conglomerated cooperatives and combine the
management and marketing from their previously separate production facilities. Without the
available capital for the acquisition, the other option for cooperatives would be to sell out to a
larger privately owned finn likely to have the capital necessary for the purchase. However, with
Gregory Mankiw, Essentials ofEconomics (Thomson South-Western, 2004), 180-185
Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustry/statistics/.
45 Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustrylstatistics/.
46 CFA "A Brief on a Canadian Cooperative Investment Plan" Canadian Federation ofAgriculture Publications
(2007) 2.
43
44
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the most recent boom in production farmer owned cooperative capacity continues to decline as a
percent of total capacity. As a result its intluence on overall market concentration is also
declining making the issue of private consolidation more important to overall market
concentration.
The path to consolidation for the privately owned firm is more straight-forward. These
production companies do not see external benefits due to increases in the price of corn and other
grains nor the benefits of rural development due to the fact that they are mostly controlled by
absentee owners. Because many private firms have the available capital to invest in the
acquisition of capacity through consolidation the option for private firms to achieve economies
of scale is to buy up existing production capacity or be bought out. The only other option would
be some sort of hybrid private-cooperative where economies of scale were achieved through a
more complex mutual agreement between a cooperative and private tirm. Therefore, although
consolidation would likely occur in various ways depending on plant ownership, it will still
likely occur in both the farmer and non farmer owned sectors of the U.S. ethanol industry and
lead to a more concentrated industry overall once trade tariffs are removed
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Increased consolidation is important to the evaluation of industrial organization as it leads to
the possibility of price fixing or monopoly pricing. This process is far from unheard of in the
agricultural processing industry as U.S. based ADM and a group of other international firms
were convicted ofjust such an act in 1993. In a more concentrated market the possibility of
monopoly pricing or monopoly power becomes available. For the purposes of this research,
concepts of monopoly pricing will be used to explain the dangers of market concentration as the
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similarities in the theory behind monopoly and oligopoly pricing and their relationships to the
subject of ethanol production make differentiation unnecessary48.
Monopoly pricing in ethanol production would occur when one firm or group of firms gains
a large enough share in the market to effectively influence the market price for ethanol.
Production firms face incentives to produce at quantities below the socially efficient levels and
charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production for ethanol. As profits are the price
received by the producer for a unit of ethanol less the cost to produce that unit, then a firm will
receive additional profits by reducing quantity or by influencing prices above the marginal cost
of production thereby capitalizing on consumers' willingness to pay. lncentives for such
behavior can be reahzed until the point where revenue of an additional unit of ethanol production
equals the cost of that additional unit of production. Beyond such a point the cost of foregone
ethanol production/supply would exceed the benefits of an increase in price/profits received by
49

the ethanol producers .
Although producers of ethanol could improve profits under monopoly price techniques, it
resu]ts in a net social loss. In a system of monopoly pricing, consumers who would have
purchased competitively priced ethanol can no longer atTord to do so, resulting in a deadweight
loss. Any upward influence on prices or reduction in quantity from the competitive equilibrium
will result in a reduction in total surplus or deadweight loss. This loss of societal net benefits is
displayed by the shaded gray area in Figure 6. The area represents units that remain unsold at
points where demand or willingness to pay exceeds marginal cost or supply. Simply stated, in the

48
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presence of monopoly/oligopoly pricing, fewer consumers realize the benefits of ethanol
consumption than would be able to in a competitive market 5o •

Figure 6
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Since there is the opportunity for trade between the United States and Brazil, making
them part of one international market, any oligopoly pricing techniques would have to also
include Brazil's dominant producers. Although sufficient data is not currently available for the
Brazilian ethanol industry to definitively say weather or not Brazil would increase its market
concentration. For the purposes of this study and because there is no available information that
would greatly conflict the assumption, it will be assumed that Brazil's production facilities
would react to incentives tor market consolidation similar to U.S. producers and therefore share
the same risks of monopoly/oligopoly pricing. Under this assumption the removal of trade tariffs
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between the U.S. and Brazil should increase overall market concentration and potential for
consolidation in both sides of the newly conjoined U.S./Brazilian ethanol market 5l .
Since removing trade tariffs to eliminate the deadweight loss associated with them creates the
potential for another social deadweight loss through price fixing, logically, trade barrier removal
should only occur if it decreases net social loss through the process or if the deadweight loss due
to trade barriers is larger than the probable deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing. Because
the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing targets consumers based on their willingness to pay it is
important to compare the price effects of the existence of trade tariffs to the potential effects of
monopoly pricing. Although it is impossible to say for certain what would occur, a likely result
can be displayed with production data provided by the RFA and estimated social costs of trade
barrier existence.
Assuming that the estimate given in 2007 by The Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial
Organization is accurate, the total cost of tariffs between the u.S. and Brazil up to 2006 has been
$80.61 million, the total losses for the United States being $37.96 million. During this time,
according to statistics from the Renewable Fuels Association, the United States has produced
approximately 38.07 billion gallons of ethanol. To estimate the cost to U.S. consumers of ethanol
trade barriers the total net loss due to existence of trade barriers is di vided· by the total gallons
produced during that same time period giving a per gallon cost of barriers to U.S. Brazilian
ethanol trade of roughly .10 cents
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When referencing this to forgone consumption it must be

noted that the lowest available unit for price differentiation is .25 cents in ethanol markets
allowing one to compare these two numbers only through the logic that a .10 cents per gallon
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Industrial Organizalion 5 (2007): 227-42.
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loss is a relatively minuscule per gallon cost in relation to how producers and consumers
currently value ethanol through commodity prices.

VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Through the theory and analysis provided in this study it can be seen that market
concentration in both farmer and non-farmer owned sectors of the production industry and the
resulting risk of monopoly pricing will likely rise with removal of tariffs that currently block the
bilateral trade of ethanol between the United States and Brazil. In order to merit removal of these
tariffs the dead weight loss due to the existence of the trade tariffs must exceed the probable
deadweight loss associated with oligopoly power and price fixing. With a per gallon gain of only
about .10 cents, from removal of trade tariffs and considering that the consumer is not even
allowed to differentiate based on a price changes smaller than .25 cents due to the practices of
the commodity trading industry, this study concludes that the benefits of tariff removal could
plausibly be negated if any significant costs to market concentration were accrued through
monopoly pricing. Simply stated, to the consumer the cost of trade barriers is so small it is
essentially UlUloticed at the per gallon level amounting to only one tenth of a cent. Although
there is no definitive answer based on available data as to weather or not the removal of tariffs on
ethanol trade between the U.S. and Brazil would result in a net gain or loss, the potential losses
due to market concentration can be significant and even the cost of increased regulation
potentially high, given the industry's history. For these reasons this study finds that the potential
for monopoly/oligopoly pricing through increased market concentration is a significant factor to
consider when discussing the removal of tariffs to trade between the United States and Brazil and
should be further researched before action is taken.
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Politicians and economists advocating trade barrier removal need to explain more
thoroughly the benefits of increased ethanol trade or explain what factors are likely to change
making these barriers to trade more costly. This dynamic market is growing and changing at such
rates that, there are many factors which are important to the industrial organization and appraisal
of industry costs and benefits that could not be incorporated into this study. These factors include
but are not limited to such benefits as job creation, increased rural development and costs such as
environmental degradation and increases in food costs through a raise in commodity prices. It is
also essential to obtain more infonnation about the industrial organization of the Brazilian
ethanol production industry and analyze more specifically the potential effects of trade barrier
removal on its current structure rather than assume it to consolidate based on the evaluation of
the U.S. production system.
This study may have concluded that current practices regarding bilateral trade between
the U.S. and Brazil are likely are potentially more efficient than certain proposed changes
however, this does not mean that the industry will not continue to evolve. It is also not the
purpose of this paper to suggest that trade barrier removal is the only factor to cause market
consolidation. It may well be that market consolidation will occur despite a relatively closed
trade structure. Based on production capacity currently under construction or expansion, the U.S.
ethanol industry will likely double in size within the next three years 53 . Global ethanol projects
around the world are also quickly growing to meet demand. Unless demand continues to grow,
supply will eventually catch up causing the currently high profits seen by ethanol producers to
fall, a change which could also cause industry consolidation to occur. There are many
possibilities for the industrial organization of U.S. ethanol and many uncertainties in its future.

Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustry/statistics/.
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For this reason ethanol and related industries need increased evaluation to better understand the
appropriate way to handle developing ethanol markets.
One important comparison for the bilateral trade of ethanol between the U.s. and Brazil
is the production of sweeteners. Similar to the current market for ethanol, U.s. artificial
sweeteners are produced from com where Brazilian sweeteners are produced form sugar. These
two industries producing relatively homogenous products are kept separate through significant
trade barriers. Interestingly enough, even with domestic protection in both markets the U.s.
market for artiticial sweeteners produced from com is highly concentrated, composed of 5 major
firms controlling 85% of the market 54 . Further study on the similarities and ditferences in the
markets for ethanol and sweeteners would be very beneficial to understanding the proper
industrial organization for the still emerging ethanol production industry.
The benefit and the curse of current studies conducted on ethanol is that, as the industry
is evolving and emerging, the studies can be up to date and "cutting edge". Yet, by the same
reasoning they can also quickly become obsolete as new information surfaces. This study has
concluded that, for the time being, the proposed removal of trade tariffs between the United
States and Brazil with regard to market concentration and industrial organization would have
potentially high costs and relatively insignificant benefits. However, continued study is needed in
this area of investigation because, although the markets for automotive fuels like ethanol are
constantly changing, the one thing that is not changing is the increasing need for efficient and
effective markets for gasoline substitutes.
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